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In the historically Orthodox Christian heartlands of Eastern and South Eastern Europe,
as well as sometimes in the Orthodox diasporic communities around the globe, one may
come across fundamentalist-like phenomena. For various reasons explained in this paper
I subsume these cases under a category which I call rigorism. Such cases exhibit certain
particularities vis-'-vis their Western Christian or Islamic counterparts and also attest to
the diversity existing within the wider and dispersed body of Orthodox Christianity.
Orthodox rigorists of varied provenance are at times in serious tension and conflict with
the respective official Orthodox Churches, while in other instances they collaborate with
them for common purposes. Using various theoretical perspectives on this topic and
selected examples from different Orthodox contexts, this paper attempts to delineate the
main contours of this phenomenon by focusing on the bearers of rigorism and their
activities, the main characteristics, the socio-historical background and the later trans-
formations of this phenomenon including its endogenous and exogenous causes. Finally,
the potential resources and counter-currents from within the Orthodox world, which are
aimed at neutralizing the rigorist influences, are also presented and discussed.
Vasilios N. Makrides is Professor of Religious Studies (specializing in Orthodox Chris-
tianity) at the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Erfurt, Germany.
Introduction
Talking about fundamentalism nowadays is neither unusual nor occasions any
surprise, for the term is widely and even increasingly used in the scholarly world
and beyond it with reference to many and quite diverse contexts, religious and
non-religious alike. Having originally been coined by external observers as a term
of opprobrium to describe a conservative surge among American Protestants
opposing liberal trends in the USA in the early 20th century, the use of this term
was later significantly amplified. It thus came to describe numerous groups in
other religions (e.g. Islam), without losing its original significance and con-
notation. The later growing politicization of fundamentalist movements and their
efforts to gain firm footholds in society were also thematized in this context.
Nonetheless, the term has often been criticized as being too generic and all-
encompassing, hence lacking analytical abilities, precision and usefulness.1 This is
1 See Antes 2000.
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because many related phenomena are lumped together as fundamentalist, a fact
obscuring or neglecting their potential idiosyncrasies and differences. It is true,
though, that this term has been long established in scholarly and non-scholarly
usage, thus it will make little sense to try to drop it or replace it by another, more
pertinent one. As is well-known, terminological issues are quite hard to deal with.
Suggesting a new term as an alternative to fundamentalism (e.g. radicalism, ex-
tremism) will not automatically solve the related problems and may even con-
tribute to more confusion and misunderstandings than before.
Therefore, it has been conclusively argued that it is better to try to clarify the
already widely used and established term through a more adequate typology or
otherwise.2 This has been attempted in recent decades as a way to overcome
previous difficulties with this term, although the categories and the criteria used
for this purpose vary significantly. For example, Martin Riesebrodt argued for a
necessary distinction between fundamentalism and traditionalism, first because
fundamentalism may include new elements as being the result of a transforma-
tional process, and second because it constitutes a militant, mobilized tradition-
alism. To this purpose, he referred to Karl Mannheim!s model of transition from
traditionalism to conservatism.3 In addition, other general questions regarding
this phenomenon need further reflection and, if possible, clarification: does
fundamentalism simply reflect a particular individual attitude, or is it embedded
in a specific social milieu and concomitant movement? What are the differences
between fundamentalist and other protest movements? Is there a fundamen-
talism avant la lettre? Should fundamentalism be viewed solely as a threat and a
grave danger? Should the term be applied solely to religious phenomena or more
broadly to the non-religious domain? What are the relations between funda-
mentalism and modernity as a whole?4
Another issue worth discussing in the present context is the existence of some
terms parallel to fundamentalism that have also been in use and that also con-
tribute to the above terminological complications. Perhaps themost prominent of
these terms is integrism, which has also been used to describe certain funda-
mentalist-like phenomena. This is especially the case in the related French or
Italian literature (int*grisme/int*gralisme or integrismo/integralismo). Charac-
teristically enough, while the term “fundamentalism” was more commonly used
for the Protestant case, the term “integrism” was mostly used with regard to
related phenomena within Roman Catholicism, whereas both terms have also
been used with regard to Islam. This signifies that certain differences may be
located between the various Christian traditions with regard to such phenomena,
despite some undeniable commonalities.5 These and other particularities and
2 See Riesebrodt 1990, p. 18.
3 See ibid., pp. 215–216.
4 See Makrides 1994a.
5 See Alexander 1985.
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difficulties become more apparent when one tries to translate the above terms
into foreign languages and convey their meaning in an adequate way.6
Now turning my attention to the Orthodox Christian world, which is the main
focus of the present article, it should be acknowledged that we also find phe-
nomena here which fall under the range of significance of the above terms and in
most cases are characterized as, or called, fundamentalist. In various texts ofmine,
written in different languages, both the term “fundamentalism”7, as well as the
term “integrism”8 have been used to describe and analyze related phenomena.
Other scholars dealing with Orthodox Christianity have also done the same, yet
from different standpoints and perspectives.9 In fact, several of the general
characteristics of such movements (Protestant and otherwise) appear to be found
mutatis mutandis among their Orthodox counterparts. However, in the scholarly
literature on these phenomena the Orthodox Christian case has generally not
been taken into account. For example, in the ambitious, five-volume The Fun-
damentalismProject (1991–1995) of theAmericanAcademyofArts and Sciences,
coordinated by Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, the related Orthodox
phenomena are conspicuously absent.
Yet, from a later perspective and taking into consideration the numerous
specificities and particularities of the Orthodox Christian context, my preference
lies with using amore neutral term to talk about such phenomena. Similar caveats
have also been expressed with regard to the other terms mentioned above. For
instance, although there have been interesting attempts to transform terms like
fundamentalism into sociological categories with potentially universal applic-
ability as indicating a very specific form of religious revival,10 its application as an
appropriate term to designate and describe specific phenomena within Roman
Catholicismhas beenquestioned.11Furthermore,we should seriously consider the
fact that, generally speaking, there is a scarcity of stricto sensu fundamentalist
movements in Europe vis-'-vis the USA or the rest of the world.12 This has been
attributed to many causes; for example, to the influence of the Enlightenment
upon Christianity in Europe. This lack of fundamentalism is also considered as a
feature underlining Europe!s exceptionalism regarding its own particular reli-
gious evolution.13 However, the above observations are grounded more in the
6 Regarding the related Greek case, see Makrides 1994b.
7 See Makrides 1991 and 2000.
8 See Makrides 2003, pp. 215–221.
9 Concerning the term“fundamentalism”, seeMorris 1998;Uliakhin 2003;Hovorun
2016; concerning the term “integrism”, see Yannaras 1990, p. 31; Lossky 1992; Kitsikis
1994.
10 See Riesebrodt 2000, pp. 269–271.
11 See Casanova 1994.
12 See Davie 2002, p. 24.
13 See Davie 2000a, p. 460.
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religious history of Western Europe. If we take a look at Orthodox Eastern and
South Eastern Europe, we do realize the existence of numerous protest groups
and movements exhibiting significant similarities to American Protestant and
Islamic fundamentalism, as well as to Roman Catholic integrism.
Nevertheless, since we are dealing with the very specific Orthodox religious
and cultural milieu, it would be more adequate to describe the phenomena under
considerationwith another term. It is for this reason that I have opted for the term
“rigorism”14, which is again not unknown in the related ample literature, despite
its rather limited use.15Eschewing an essentialist definition of this term, it is, first,
a more inclusive one covering various phenomena with family resemblances.
More importantly, it may also include phenomena that historically precede the
first appearance of the term “fundamentalism”. In fact, this is what particularly
applies to the Orthodox case. Second, it allows the flexible use of elements from
various theoretical schemes in order to do justice to the particularities of the given
case. Third, it ismore neutral, since other terms have quite a loaded history, having
been associated in the past with a specific religion or culture, a fact that often
obscures their analytical usefulness. Hence, its use with regard to Orthodox
Christianity is principally unproblematic. Fourth, it underlines some main fea-
tures of such phenomena; namely the uncompromising positions, the in-
transigence, the radicalness and the militancy of certain hardliners in upholding
their own views, often being antagonistic towards the surrounding culture and the
leadership of their religion. For all these reasons, this term seems to be more
appropriate and fitting to theOrthodox situation, where the cleavage between the
church hierarchy and the rigorists is usually evident.
To be more specific, for various reasons it is inadequate to simply place the
Russian Old Believers (from the late 17th century onwards) or the various groups
of Old Calendarists (from the early 20th century onwards) in different contexts –
both having to do with a strong attachment to ritualism and established liturgical
traditions – under the category of fundamentalism. The first case especially has a
much longer history than the term “fundamentalism” and modern related phe-
nomena.Moreover, this term fails to bring to light some common and key features
of these Orthodox protest movements; for example, their strong anti-Western
stance, as well as their care for and rigor in interpreting and upholding the highly
treasured Orthodoxy as the sole right faith in the entire world. A similar problem
may be detected when referring to Scripturalism (a strict adherence to a literal
interpretation of the Bible), which can be observed both among Orthodox rigo-
rists and Protestant fundamentalists. Apparently, both cases sharemany common
characteristics in this regard, yet the differences between them are again con-
spicuous and cannot be made clear if we were to talk indistinctly of a “Biblical
14 See Makrides 2004 and 2014a.
15 See Gellner 1992, p. 2; Gladigow 1993; Harwazinski 1999.
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fundamentalism”16. Orthodox Scripturalism has again a much longer history than
the Protestant one and is further connected with several other key issues (e. g. the
role of tradition), which are lacking in the Protestant counterpart. By introducing
the term “rigorism” thus, my intention is neither to solve the aforementioned
terminological problems, nor to propose it as the ideal one to be used generally in
related contexts. It is basically about a more neutral and appropriate term, which
can be applied to various cases including the Orthodox one and conceptualized
accordingly.
1. Who are the Orthodox rigorists?
The bearers of Orthodox rigorism do not represent a single and uniform unit, but
can be located across a wide spectrum of people with varied provenance, social
status and orientation. These may act individually and independently in specific
contexts, but in other cases they may be organized in respective movements,
organizations and groups, thus enhancing their mobilization power, visibility and
effectiveness. Themain problem, however, is that they cannot be always identified
as such, for they may also appear and act in broader settings that include other
groups and actors, as well, and sometimes non-religious ones. The chief issue here
is to locate the differentiae specificae of Orthodox rigorism. For instance, to ex-
press anti-modern views or exhibit an anti-Western stance neither renders
someone nor a group automatically rigorist.
This holds, at first, true for the church hierarchy and selectedmembers of it who
may profess such views or may entertain close relations with rigorists. In most
cases, such rigorists can bedistinguished from the official church hierarchy and the
mainstream Orthodox believers. However, no absolute and strict demarcation
line can be drawnbetween them, as the boundaries remain inmany cases fluid and
easily penetrable. The phenomenon of church hierarchs supporting rigorists out
of various considerations and for numerous reasons is not out of the ordinary. The
church hierarchies in predominantly Orthodox countries, mostly in Eastern and
South Eastern Europe, try to keep a balanced and diplomatic position in society,
not least because of their close relations with the respective states. Yet, the phe-
nomenon of some bishops expressing extreme views and having close contacts
with or even supporting Orthodox rigorists is not unusual. Despite attempts to
silence or isolate them, they alwaysmanage to voice their highly critical views and
make headlines.
TheGreekMetropolitan of Florina, Eordaia and PrespesAugustinosKantiotis
(1907–2010, in office between 1967 and 2000), was notorious in this respect and
has left quite a vivid legacy among his numerous followers through his religious
16 See Makrides 1995, pp. 568–625.
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organization Stau1o´& (Cross).17 Even before becoming a bishop, Kantiotis had
been known throughout Greece as a militant and uncompromising person. He
had frequent conflicts with his church colleagues, who did not share his militancy
while trying to isolate him. “Kantiotism” has therefore been considered by many
as a scourge within Greek Orthodoxy.18 It is noteworthy that the Patriarchate of
Constantinople intervened in cases when Kantiotis! followers were accused of
rigorist and subversive activities in various Orthodox dioceses, such as in Aus-
tralia. A lay theologian of Kantiotis! movement, Nikolaos Sotiropoulos, was
formally excommunicated by the Patriarchate in 1993 on the grounds of such
activities.19Yet, the very fact thatKantiotis remained simultaneously amember of
the church hierarchy and a major representative of rigorism reveals the com-
plexity of their intertwined connections and the dynamics that can develop in this
context. Currently, the Greek Metropolitan of Piraeus, Serapheim (Mentzelo-
poulos), is another member of the church hierarchy representing such a rigorist
stance.His controversial positions onmany issues (e. g. anti-Semitic, anti-modern,
anti-Ecumenical, anti-Catholic) have stirred many reactions from different sides
including from other Orthodox hierarchs.20Within the Russian Orthodox Church
one can also locate several bishops with a similar rigorist mentality, reacting
against their more liberal or moderate fellows.21 Consequently, the Metropolitan
of St. Petersburg and Ladoga Ioann Snychev (1927–1995) has been placed in this
category.22
Such cases are generally isolated and do not represent those of the Orthodox
mainstream and that of the church hierarchy as a whole trying to mitigate in
debatable issues and keep amore balanced and reasonable stance. Yet, the church
position as such is not absolutely clear on this matter and remains rather am-
bivalent. On the one hand, it avoids being associated with rigorism, but on the
other hand, it makes use of the rigorist potential to strengthen its own initiatives,
policies and strategies under specific circumstances. Whenever there was a major
conflict between church and state, the former usually mobilized the entire Or-
thodox flockwithoutmaking any distinctions. In this sense,Orthodox rigorists are
equally eager to support the official church in such criticalmoments, because their
final aim is not its dissolution, but its amelioration. For example, GreekOrthodox
rigorists of every provenance played a crucial role in the massive demonstrations
against the socialist government!s plans to nationalize the ecclesiastical and
17 See Giannakopoulos 1999, pp. 327–332.
18 See Stylianos 1994, p. 576.
19 See Ekklhsi´a 71 (1–15 January 1994), p. 16.
20 See Seraphim (Mentzelopoulos) of Piraeus on orthodoxwiki, available at: http://
orthodoxwiki.org/Seraphim_%28Mentzelopoulos%29_of_Piraeus [24.01.2016].
21 See Mitrokhin 2004, pp. 185–190.
22 See Slater 2000; Shnirelman 2015, p. 137.
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monastic property in 1987,23 as well as against another state decision to drop the
data on religious affiliation from new identity cards in 200024. In various incidents
(1994–1995) related to the exclusive religious or secular use of an old historic
Roman building in the city of Thessaloniki in Greece, the Rotunda, the local
diocesemobilizedmany rigorists, whowere considered responsible for some riots,
clashes and violent actions that occurred there.25 Understandably, all this com-
plicates again the separation between official church hierarchy and rigorists. It
should also be mentioned that in such broader mobilization attempts, other and
especially non-religious actors may participate, such as those stemming from the
right or even extreme right political spectrum. For example, the recent rise of such
a political party named “Golden Dawn” in Greece has revealed that it has many
sympathizers from the broader Orthodox domain, although there is also an Or-
thodox criticism against it, especially against its fascist and neo-pagan leanings.26
The above ambivalence becomes evident also by considering that the rigorists
do not intend to leave Orthodoxy for another religion, but they basically criticize
the present condition of the church as unacceptable. In most cases, they would
have preferred to submit themselves to the church hierarchy provided that it had
fulfilled their needs and visions completely. Even in cases when there is a schism
between rigorists and the official church, the ideal solution for both sides is re-
unification, although the requirements for such an undertaking are seen differ-
ently by each side. Therefore, the harsh critique of the official church by the
rigorists should not obfuscate the fact that they both have much more in common
than simply differences.
This applies first to the Old Calendarists. Although separated administratively
from the official church, moderate Old Calendarist circles still acknowledge its
legitimacy and recognize the sacraments it performs, only opposing its in-
novations andEcumenical compromises. SolelyOldCalendarist hardliners follow
the austere line of a complete separation, claiming that the official (New Calen-
darist) church has completely lost the sanctifying grace of sacraments and fallen
victim to apostasy and heresy.27 Mainstream Orthodox believers are not pro-
hibited by the official church from going to Old Calendarist churches, a fact
showing the fluidity of the above separation markers. The same is true for the
monastic community of the Holy Mountain Athos. Although it follows the old
calendar, it shows no discrimination, aside from the Zealots, towards the New
Calendarist Orthodox believers and keeps good relations with the church hier-
archy and the state. After all, there are no major dogmatic and other differences
23 See D-pret 2010.
24 See Makrides 2005; D-pret 2012.
25 See Stewart 1998.
26 See Sakellariou 2014.
27 Brady and Melling (2001, p. 356), who distinguish here between “resistance” and
“integrist” Old Calendarism.
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between the Old Calendarists and the mainstream Orthodox Church, aside from
the calendar issue.
Yet, occasional cooperation between the official church and rigorists does not
signify the normalization of their relations. The official church is aware of the
potential danger that rigorists may bring to the unity of the church body, thus it
intends to keep them completely under control and to mitigate their militancy,
while alsomobilizing them for commonobjectives. This policy is however not very
successful, especially when rigorist criticism of the official church escalates into
real confrontation. The radical and violent events in the early 1990s in the diocese
of Larissa and Tyrnavos in Greece proved that the rigorist camp cannot be kept
under control or used ad libitum according to the will of the church hierarchy.28
The seriousness of this prolonged conflict forced the then Archbishop of Athens
and All Greece Serapheim (Tikas) to issue official encyclicals condemning the
rigorist positions and actions as non-Orthodox and admonishing the mainstream
Orthodox flock to keep a distance from them.29 In many cases, rigorists are thus
seen as a real threat, and harsh measures against them on the part of the official
church are not out of the ordinary.
Another examplemay illustrate this situation. InDecember 2002 the Patriarch
of Constantinople Bartholomew I declared the Zealots of the Esphigmenou
Monastery of the Holy Mountain Athos schismatic and outside the church, and
tried to expel them until the end of January 2003 with the help of state authorities.
His intention was to bring this monastery into full communion with the rest of the
Holy Community of Mount Athos. The main reason was that the Esphigmenou
monks had been very critical of the Ecumenical endeavors of Patriarch Athe-
nagoras (1886–1972) and his “dialogue of love” with the Roman Catholic Church
from the 1960s onwards. Taking control of themonastery in 1971, they thus ceased
commemorating the Patriarch!s name in Liturgy and followed a strict and iso-
lationist policy, refusing participation in the common administration of the Holy
Community ofMountAthos. In thewake of the above decision, police authorities
cut the electricity to the monastery and prevented the supply of food, heating oil
and medical provisions, while more than 100 monks barricaded themselves in the
monastery and appealed to the Council of State. The conflict still remains un-
solved,30 while it attests to the strength, persistence and endurance of Orthodox
rigorism. Aside from the Esphigmenou Monastery, there exist many other sim-
28 For the rigorist positions, see agonas-homepage, available at: http://www.agonas.
org/ [24.01.2016].
29 See the encyclical no. 2564 of 25 October 1993 against the “Panhellenic Orthodox
Union” and its newspaper O1qo´doxo& Tu´po& (Orthodox Press); see Ekklhsi´a 70 (1
November 1993), p. 597.
30 See homepage ofEsphigmenouMonastery, available at: http://www.esphigmenou.
com/ [24.01.2016].
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ilarly-minded Zealot monks living as isolated hermits in the southern part of the
Mount Athos peninsula.31
From the rigorist point of view, the main issues of controversy with the official
church can be summarized as follows; first, the dependence of the church to the
state, its rather superficial role in society, and all the concomitant compromises
jeopardizing the authentic Orthodox tradition; second, the creation of a really
free and living church organization through purification from all deficits, namely
from moral and financial scandals to the modernizing and secularizing trends of
many church hierarchs; third, the active participation ofOrthodox lay believers in
the election of their church leaders, who have to be blameless in every respect;
fourth, the adulterating consequences of the contemporary global environment,
including the European Union, on the preservation of the Orthodox tradition;
and finally, the official participation of the Orthodox Church in the “heretical”
Ecumenical Movement and the bilateral dialogues with other Christians, such as
with Roman Catholics, who are considered to have deviated from the right faith.
These issues are, however, raised occasionally by members of the official church,
for they constitute matters of serious reflection (cf. the reaction of the afore-
mentionedMetropolitan of Piraeus Serapheim against the visit of Pope Francis to
the Greek island of Lesvos in April 2016 due to the refugee and migrant crisis32).
Likewise, anti-Ecumenical stances at the official church level are not an exception
today. To be more specific, the Orthodox Church of Georgia in 199733 and that of
Bulgaria in 199834 have formally withdrawn their membership from the World
Council of Churches and the Conference of European Churches.
It is vital in this context to avoid confusing the rigorist positions of certain
church hierarchs with the overall traditionalist stance of the church hierarchy. In
fact, the church usually looks for a “third way” between rigorist and liberal po-
sitions and tries to mediate between the different camps. On the other hand, its
general stance is admittedly more conservative, which brings it closer to the
rigorist camp and explains their usual correlations and constant interferences.
Being part of a long historical chain of fidelity to the bequeathed Christian tra-
dition, the Orthodox Church is particularly sensitive to this issue. It also appears
to be much more traditional than the Western Christian Churches, both Roman
Catholic and Protestant. As a result, it often supports positions that are difficult to
understand by Western criteria and modes of thinking.
According to several scholars, the above is the case with the official Russian
Orthodox Church in post-Soviet times, exemplifying this “third way” between
31 See Brady 2001, p. 528.
32 See online article “Pura toumitropoliti serafeimkata patriarhi kai papa”, available
at: http://www.protothema.gr/greece/article/568020/pura-tou-mitropoliti-serafeim-kata-
patriarhi-kai-papa-/ [15.04. 2016].
33 See Crego 2014, pp. 146–147.
34 See Kalkandjieva 2014, p. 123.
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rigorism and liberalism.35 Its positions appear in many respects incompatible with
those of the Western Churches and with the values of the Western world – con-
sider, for example, its official position of 2008 on human dignity, freedom and
rights, which has created many debates internationally. One of the main aims of
this church today is the defense of so-called “traditional values”, an agenda which
has a clear anti-Western purpose.Despite all this, the same church does not retreat
to its own insulated enclave, but seeks the dialogue with the Western Churches
and the secular world while trying to develop its international and transnational
activities in an impressive way. It would be thus amiss to call this church rigorist
simply because of its critique of modern liberal secular values and orientations.
Quite clearly, it does not share the militancy, the aggressiveness and the apoc-
alyptic fervor usually characterizing the Orthodox rigorists. In addition, it always
tries to keep the latter under control, as it fears an eventual intensification of
rigorist reactions and their potential greater influence on the wider church body.
The same applied to the Orthodox Church of Greece under the leadership of
the charismatic, yet controversialArchbishopChristodoulos (1998–2008).Hewas
often accused of disseminating extreme and radical views, but his aim was to
reverse the moderate secularization process within Greek society and to act
against the privatization of religion by rendering the church a key public factor in
the country. In this respect, despite similarities, his attitude was not clearly rigo-
rist, but rather conservative and neo-traditionalist.36 Here it is about fine dis-
tinctions that draw necessary separation lines between the various phenomena
under consideration in order to better capture their eventual specific character-
istics and manifestations.
Furthermore, not every actor or group expressing anti-modern or anti-Western
views can be subsumed under the category ofOrthodox rigorism. In specific cases,
certain movements lie somehow in-between sharing selected elements with
rigorists, and distinguishing themselves from them on other issues. The semi-
monastic brotherhoods in 20th century Greece, especially the one named Zwh´
(Life), together with their affiliated sisterhoods and other dependent organ-
izations, belong to this category. Basically, they were pietistic in outlook and
focused more on internal mission and the spiritual improvement of their mem-
bers. They also contributed to the spread of rigorism, especially through social
activism, puritan ethics, patriarchal values, nationalistic orientations and anti-
Western attitudes. Yet, these rigorist impulses were mitigated by their more
balanced strategy towards the official church and society, usually avoiding getting
involved in open conflicts. As a result, despite occasional distancing from, and
tension with, the official church, there was never a schism between them.37Other
movements, though, like the elitist intellectual one in Greece in the 1980s known
35 See Selbach 2002, pp. 152–165; Papkova 2011; Stoeckl 2014.
36 See Makrides 2014b, pp. 187–195.
37 See Giannakopoulos 1999; Dimanopoulou 2010.
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as “Neo-Orthodoxy”, by nomeans belong to the category of rigorism. Aside from
its intense anti-Westernism, the latter movement did not share many of the main
rigorist characteristics and had other objectives. Other organizations, however,
such as the previously mentioned Panellh´nio&O1qo´doxo& Enwsi& (Panhellenic
Orthodox Union), clearly belong to the rigorist camp, as they formulate a highly
critical and aggressive discourse and seek to mobilize their adherents against
anything that they perceive as danger for Orthodoxy and Greece.
What is then quite typical of Orthodox rigorist groups and actors? We should
keep in mind that the rigorist camp is basically construed along cultural com-
monalities rather than class cleavages.38 Such rigorists usually exhibit a strong
Manichaean mentality and are guided by apocalyptic and eschatological scenar-
ios, based on theBook of Revelation and other prophetic texts and legends, about
a general battle between good and evil and the imminent end of theworld.Among
them the enemy syndrome is particularly strong and pervasive. They constantly
locate lurking enemies everywhere who have designs against Orthodoxy. This
condition is further strengthened by conspiracy theories of all sorts (especially
involving Jews and Freemasons) aimed at destroying the pristine Orthodox faith.
Yet, we should not assume that rigorists are generally uneducated and ignorant
persons, as a common and widespread stereotype about such and related people
usually postulates. To put it correctly, it is about the overall rigorist discourse
which lacks sophistication, complexity and erudition, as it tends to give simplistic,
one-dimensional and categorical answers to the questions it deals with on the
basis of a dichotomic logic.Additionally, rigorists place particular emphasis on the
supposedly intact preservation of Orthodoxy, the sole true faith revealed by God
in the entire world, and are ready to go to extremes in guarding and protecting it.
They also defend puritanical ethics and patriarchal family values. As a result, they
are usually militant in outlook and may also resort to violent actions in pursuing
their goals, given that violence receives strong divine legitimacy by their over-
arching conceptual scheme. Another feature relates to the phenomenon of
“Hyper-Orthodoxy”, namely when rigorists accuse each other of betrayal and
deviation from the right Orthodox path. This, in turn, leads to numerous internal
schisms within the rigorist camp and to the creation of opposite splinter-groups
competing and claiming the sole authentic possession of the right faith.39 In some
extreme cases, rigorists may decide to sacrifice their lives for their beliefs in an
apocalyptic battle against the “powers of darkness” and look for salvation in
escaping this world. The sense of their electedness as representing the faithful
remnant in a sinful world is particularly strong and pervasive among them and
leads to greater tension with their surrounding environment, religious and oth-
erwise. In general, the lines separating the rigorists from the outside fallen world
(which may also include the official church) are drawn in strict and clear terms.
38 See Riesebrodt 2000, pp. 277–279.
39 See Makrides 1991, pp. 62–65.
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Such attitudes can be clearly observed in the early history of theOld Believers!
movement in the Russian Empire, who separated themselves from the official
church in 1666/7 after the church and ritual reforms initiated by Patriarch Nikon.
These were interpreted as cardinal deviations from the already definitely estab-
lished Orthodox faith and tradition, and as clear signs of the imminent coming of
the Antichrist and the final battle between good and evil. As a result, they were
violently persecuted afterwards by state forces with church support and retreated
to isolated places in their own enclaves. In several cases at the end of the 17th and
early 18th century, they preferred self-immolation in an utterly apocalyptic climate
rather than surrendering to the state forces and the “heretical Russian Church”,
representing the fall from the right faith. In fact, these are believed to be the
biggest mass suicide cases known in history.40 All this forced Old Believers to
massive emigration abroad, and their communities are nowadays found in dif-
ferent parts of the world, from Central Asia to Canada and South America. From
the 19th century onwards they progressively gainedmore legitimacy in society, yet
the typical features of Orthodox rigorism accompanied them constantly. Further,
there were numerous internal schisms within theOld Believers!movement out of
various reasons leading to the formation ofmany competing groups. Twowide sets
of groups are those of the popovtsy (priestly) and the bezpopovtsy (priestless),
having to do with the problem of legitimate priestly succession and the issue of
authority in their ranks.41 Characteristically, the above mentioned features of a
rigorist mentality can be observed among various contemporary Old Believers!
communities across the globe, as a social anthropological study of such a com-
munity in Canada has vividly shown.42
Similar attitudes can be observed in the aforementioned protest movement of
the Old Calendarists, the self-named “True Orthodox Christians”, and their af-
filiated organizations. These came into being in the wake of the adoption of the
new (corrected Gregorian) calendar by the Patriarchate of Constantinople in
1923 and by the Greek Orthodox Church in 1924. After initial (organized) op-
position to the reform, a schism followed when three metropolitans left the Or-
thodoxChurch ofGreece in 1935 and founded a separate synod. In particular,Old
Calendarists condemned the Ecumenical openings of the Orthodox Church, es-
pecially of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, towards Western Churches and
have always kept a highly anti-Ecumenical stance. But soon afterwards therewere
several internal splits within the Old Calendarist movement itself. This led to the
creation of various jurisdictions of Old Calendarists in different countries, whose
number is estimated in hundreds of thousands, while their sympathizers are much
more numerous. Today, Old Calendarists are found not only in Greece, Cyprus,
Romania and Bulgaria, but also have communities and deploy activities else-
40 See Robbins 1986.
41 See Feldmann 1995.
42 See Scheffel 1991.
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where (Western Europe, USA). There have been attempts to establish a broader
intercommunion between them, as in 1977 between the Greek Old Calendarist
“Cyprianite” group and the Romanian Old Calendarists.43 Like in the previous
case of the Old Believers, living in aWestern setting does not necessarily render a
group or an actor more tolerant and liberal, but, on the contrary, may lead to
further isolation and radicalization. Needless to say, Old Calendarists deny any
relationship with fundamentalism while accusing their opponents and critics of
endorsing such an attitude.44
Another area in which rigorist mentalities and attitudes especially flourish, as
the previously mentioned Esphigmenou case has shown, is the Orthodox mo-
nastic world, although rigorism is certainly not representative of the entire
spectrum of Orthodox monasticism.45A case in point, here, are the conversations
the Scottish writer William Dalrymple held with a monk named Theophanes at
theGreekOrthodoxMar Sabamonastery in theWest Bank.46Despite the literary
reworking of these conversations and their hilarious nature, one may hear what
Father Theophanes appears to say there frommany otherOrthodoxmonks. Anti-
Western, anti-Catholic and anti-Ecumenical mentalities, apocalyptic scenarios,
Manichaean worldviews and conspiracy theories involving Jews, Freemasons and
Western Christians remain exactly the same. Historically speaking, monastics
always presented problems to the church hierarchy and the state (e.g. in By-
zantium during the Iconoclastic controversy) due to their adamant, rigid and
uncompromising views. Also, the fact that in many cases monastics enjoy a higher
esteemamongOrthodox believers due to theirway of life than themembers of the
church hierarchy contributes to this tension. In reality, monastics are ready to
differentiate themselves from the church hierarchy and themainstreamwhenever
they suspect compromises jeopardizing the Orthodox faith. It is thus not acci-
dental that the above mentioned Old Calendarist movement initially found a
fertile ground to spread amongmonastics (e.g. the Zealots on theHolyMountain
Athos), a fact that remains valid until today. Interestingly, recent attempts to
renovate and modernize the Athos monastic community through subventions
from the European Union have altered its historical and traditional profile to a
large extent. Therefore, it came as no surprise that this process triggered again
numerous rigorist reactions of all sorts.47
Similar attitudes and trends can be observed in many Orthodox monastic mi-
lieus in post-communist times (e.g. inRussia, Romania,Georgia). This has a lot to
do with the challenges that these churches as a whole have faced in the post-
communist period, which, among other things, required a novel arrangement with
43 See Brady / Melling 2001, p. 355.
44 See Cyprian 1997.
45 For such variations within Orthodox Romanian monasticism, see Moga 2010.
46 See Dalrymple 1998, pp. 279–309.
47 See Fajfer 2013.
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the Western world and Churches. Such a transition was quite difficult; a fact
explaining the numerous related tensions, debates and conflicts. It is in this con-
text that Orthodox rigorists often became quite radical, aggressive and violent
attempting to implement their ideas in society and voicing their protest against the
dangers posed to the Orthodox tradition. This change can be explained by ref-
erence to the model of “de-secularization”.48 Many post-communist countries
have become the scenes of such violent incidents involving Orthodox actors who
felt threatened by various novel developments, especially globalization, secular-
ism, liberalism, pluralism andmulticulturalism.49 For example, in Ekaterinburg in
1998 several theological books written by well-known Russian Orthodox theo-
logians (A. Men!, A. Schmemann, J. Meyendorff) were publicly burned at the
courtyard of a theological seminary because they were considered to contain
liberal and heretical doctrines in clear disagreement with the Orthodox faith.
Interestingly enough, the local bishop Nikon (Mironov) seemed to have been
involved in the whole incident,50 which shows again the shifting boundaries be-
tween official church and rigorism. A year later, however, due to various other
accusations the bishop was removed from his office by the Holy Synod of the
Russian Orthodox Church.
In another case in Moscow, a modern art exhibition, entitled “Beware, Reli-
gion!” (Ostorozhno, religiia!), was organized at the Zakharov-Museum and
Cultural Center in January 2003. This exhibition was, however, considered by
several Orthodox hardliners as blasphemous, insulting and highly provocative,
this is why they stormed the building and interrupted the exhibition causing
serious damage to the exhibits. Remarkably, these rigorists were finally acquitted
by the court, which in turn condemned the organizers of the exhibition to a
financial penalty for insulting the religious feelings of the Orthodox population.51
Last, but not least, one has to mention the numerous cases of discrimination and
harassment of non-Orthodox religious communities in Russia, mostly at a local
level and often including violent actions, by Orthodox rigorists of varied prove-
nance, which have been repeatedly publicized by the international fora on reli-
gious freedom.52
Such escalations of Orthodox-motivated violence do not however take place
solely in post-communists contexts, but have also taken place earlier in the Or-
thodox world, mostly in a rigorist frame. After all, there is a long historical tra-
dition of a specific Orthodox zealotry and rigorism, which, among other things,
involved coercion, use of force and violence (e.g. in late antique Byzantium53).
48 See Karpov 2010.
49 See Verkhovskii 1998–99, pp. 109–112.
50 See Sourozh 73 (August 1998), pp. 43–45; Platonov 1998.
51 See Agadjanian 2014, pp. 98–109.
52 See Forum 18 News Service, available at: http://www.forum18.org/ [24. 01.2016].
53 See some cases in Drake 2006.
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The murder of the Neoplatonic philosopher Hypatia in Alexandria in 415 by a
Christian mob is a well-known case in point. To mention another modern case: in
Greece in 1988 Orthodox rigorists attacked and caused damage to some cinemas
in Athens where the film The Last Temptation of Christ, directed by Martin
Scorsese and based on the homonymous and controversial novel by Nikos Ka-
zantzakis, was shown. This was because the film was thought to offend the person
of Jesus Christ and his divinity.54
The targets of rigorist reactions have also experienced transformation over the
course of time. For instance, their traditional anti-Westernism was often trans-
formed into an anti-Europeanism, especially after 1981 when Greece, as the first
predominantly Orthodox country, officially joined the European Economic
Community. Further developments within this frame always gave rise to Ortho-
dox responses, as rigorists feared the loss of national sovereignty within the later
European Union and the adulteration of the authentic Orthodox tradition. All
these events were usually interpreted in apocalyptic terms as indicating the im-
minent coming of the end of the world. This also explains the 1998 massive re-
actions in Athens against the ratification of the Schengen Convention by the
Greek Parliament (8 December 1997).55 Rigorist reactions may also turn against
the perceived negative effects of the ongoing globalization process and the dan-
gers it puts to local cultures. Thus, the cases of Orthodox rigorists involved in
various anti-globalization protests against the “new world order” after the end of
communism should also be mentioned.
Finally, another terrain, in which such rigorist mentalities and attitudes can be
located, concerns the various converts to Orthodox Christianity across the globe.
In fact, this is a growing phenomenon in several contexts, Western and non-
Western alike, with numerous and diverse manifestations. To be true, the con-
version process is a multifarious and complex one and may have quite diverse
consequences for the converted person. In our case, some converts are deeply
affected by the fact that Orthodoxy claims to be the sole authentic form of
Christianity going back to the Christian origins and the sole true religious faith in
the world. To a large extent, this has to do with the consequences of the literal
understanding of the term “Orthodoxy”, which will be explained more ex-
tensively in the next section. Such intense, absolute and exclusive claims convey a
strong sense of certainty and concomitant confidence with far-reaching re-
percussions. In this way, the phenomenon of converts, appearing sometimes as
“born-again” Christians and expressing rigorist views, even against mainstream
Orthodox believers, is not an exception. The usual features of rigorismmentioned
above appear in many such cases in extreme and even idiosyncratic forms. Good
examples thereof are the controversial street evangelist and cleric in the USA
54 See Makrides 1991, p. 59–60.
55 See Makrides 2004, p. 514.
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Nathanael Kapner, who is a convert to Orthodoxy from Judaism,56 and the writer,
film director and public speaker Frank Schaeffer57. All this is indicative of the rich
variety of the forms and ways in which Orthodox rigorism makes itself active,
known and publicly visible.
2. Background, development and transformation of Orthodox
rigorism
In view of the specificities of Orthodox rigorism, it appears necessary to make
them clearer and more understandable by examining the background, the de-
velopment and the later transformations of the entire phenomenon. Althoughmy
main focus here lies more on its modern aspects, the long socio-historical back-
ground of Orthodox rigorism should also be taken into account. No doubt, as
already mentioned, cases of rigor, zealotry and extremism can be observed
throughout the history of Orthodox Christianity, being motivated, among other
things, by the unshaken belief in the singular and exclusive correctness and ab-
soluteness of the Orthodox faith. Although there is a line of continuity, modern
Orthodox rigorism should bemainly associated with the radical changes that took
place from the earlymodern period onwards and have posed serious challenges to
European Christianity as a whole. In discussing the modern background of Or-
thodox rigorism in a succinct way, it is helpful to distinguish between the endog-
enous and the exogenous causes of the phenomenon. The endogenous ones refer
more to cardinal and interrelated factors germane to the overall articulation and
development of Orthodox Christianity across time and its own historical for-
mation. The exogenous ones relate more to specific influences and challenges to
the Orthodox world coming from outside (mostly and usually from Western
Europe in modern times), which triggered various responses and reactions in-
cluding rigorist ones in specific Orthodox contexts.
Starting with the endogenous causes, we should first mention the catalytic
significance that the historical East-West opposition had in Europe from By-
zantine times and especially in the wake of the separation of the two churches.
There already exists quite a huge array of literature about the far-reaching and
multidimensional consequences of the “Great Schism” (1054) between East and
West. Orthodox anti-Westernism is nowadays still a resilient and widespread
phenomenon among various Orthodox circles including the rigorists. When the
ailing Pope John Paul II visited Athens on May 2001 for just one day, there were
massive Orthodox reactions, especially initiated and coordinated by various
56 See Nathanael Kapner on rationalwiki, available at: http://rationalwiki.org/wiki/
Nathanael_Kapner [24.01.2016].
57 See Schaeffer 1995 and 2002.
231
Orthodox Christian rigorism
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC-ND
rigorist organizations and actors.58 This is because in the eyes of these Orthodox,
the Pope personified the entire Roman Catholic Church, which has been inimi-
cally viewed for many centuries as fallen, heretical and the “abode of the Anti-
christ”, and is still considered as a major threat to the Orthodox world. This is
typical of the enemy syndrome and defensive attitudes characterizing generations
of Orthodox Christians including the rigorists, both historically and at present.
Interestingly enough, the East-West opposition did not remain solely a religious
one, but included many other non-religious aspects. Western Europe and – more
broadly speaking – the West came to signify for numerous Orthodox the places
out of which dangers for the Orthodox East had solely originated. It is about the
“secularization” of the original Orthodox anti-Westernism and its incorporation
into a wider anti-Western scheme. Characteristically, this anti-Western frame is
not supported solely by Orthodox actors, but is endorsed under specific circum-
stances by secular ones for various reasons (e.g. political, social, cultural). Nev-
ertheless, the Orthodox dimension of anti-Westernism remains the cardinal and
prominent one in the rigorist worldview and discourse, as they prefer to evaluate
past and current events according to their own specific criteria (e. g. eschato-
logical, apocalyptic, Manichaean). On the contrary, the official church hierarchy
generally ismore diplomatic and careful in its relation to theWesternChurches. In
sum, the strong anti-Western sentiments of the rigorists should be placed on this
broader historical Orthodox canvas of anti-Westernism in order to be adequately
understood.59
Another vital factor in this category has to dowith the particular understanding
of the term “Orthodoxy” in our milieu across history,60 which should be also
examined against the background of the consequences that the establishment of
monotheistic religions brought about historically.61No doubt, this term is applied
to a plurality of different cases today, both in religious and non-religious contexts.
The potential relations between fundamentalism in general and the notion of
Orthodoxy have also been discussed. Jaroslav Pelikan has tried to dissociate the
teachings of modern American Protestant fundamentalism from those of Chris-
tian Orthodoxy; namely from the mainstream of the historical development of
Christian doctrine, both in its pluralism and its underlying consensus.62Yet, in our
case we are referring to a particular literal understanding of the term “Ortho-
doxy”, which has been deeply ingrained as such in Orthodox Christian con-
sciousness over the centuries. The Orthodox are subsequently seen as the only
ones in possession of the sole right and exclusive religious faith in the entireworld,
based on God!s revelation, from which Western Christians have deviated. The
58 See Sera.dari 2002.
59 See Makrides / Uffelmann 2003.
60 See Makrides 2001–2002 and 2014a.
61 See Stark 2001.
62 See Pelikan 1990.
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right Christian faith and its exact, unaltered preservation were thus regarded as
extremely important in life and were also inextricably connected with the salva-
tion of the soul and eternal life after death. Already in Byzantine times and
especially in thewakeof theEast-West church conflicts, the issue of preserving the
right Christian faith became a most central one. In many cases, possessing Or-
thodoxy was regarded as the highest achievement one could ask for in life. Out of
this strong and pervasive conviction, various socio-cultural consequences arose
historically in the Orthodox world. For example, in the modern period several
Orthodox Christians tried to compensate for the deficits of their societies by
emphasizing the insuperable value of Orthodoxy that they always possessed. In
their view, this was the sole true criterion of superiority and electedness, clearly
distinguishing the authentic Orthodox East from the fallen Western Europe. The
latter was successful solely in numerous trivial mundane areas, yet it lacked Or-
thodoxy, which in fact rendered it inferior. Such and similar arguments were
formulated and disseminated by the Orthodox in many cases, especially when a
comparison between the achievements ofEast andWestwas at hand.63All this has
to dowith themultiple socio-cultural consequences of the literal understanding of
the term “Orthodoxy” in the past and at present, which is rather unique in our
case. Such consequences can also be observed among Orthodox rigorists, even in
extreme forms. Many aforementioned special and other features of Orthodox
rigorism have a lot to do with this particular literal understanding of Orthodoxy,
which in the end resorts to the ideology of “Orthodoxism”. This includes, among
other things, a sense of superiority, triumphalism, self-complacency and self-suf-
ficiency, Manichaean mentality, enemy syndrome, conspiracy theories, and last
but not least, the use of violence. The latter is usually justified by reference to the
right, legitimate and higher aims of Orthodox rigorism. In sum, the above phe-
nomenon can be observed with varying intensity during different periods of Or-
thodox history, while the rigorists are part of this long chain of understanding and
internalizing Orthodoxy in such a particular way.
A related important factor, on which the rigorists also place particular em-
phasis, relates to the position of traditionwithinOrthodoxChristianity as awhole.
By comparing it with the Roman Catholic or the Protestant cases, it becomes
obvious that Orthodox Christianity is much more traditional. After all, it also
claims to be the only church to have kept the authentic Christian tradition without
major or minor innovations across time. All this creates quite a traditionalistic
environment that neglects and denies reforms altogether while always idealizing
the “idyllic past” and its normative character in evaluating the present and the
future situation.64 Remarkably, this kind of Orthodox traditionalism has often
overcome its religious borders historically and has become more influential in
society, politics and culture – again a “secularization” of this initially religious
63 See Makrides 2006.
64 See Ramet 2006.
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phenomenon. For the rigorists oncemore, to be connectedwith this long historical
chain of upholding theOrthodox tradition intact is regarded as a sine qua non and
becomes the source of their strongmotivation and sense of electedness. Especially
under the conditions of modernity and postmodernity, as well as the ongoing
globalization process, rigorists fear the loss or the adulteration of the Orthodox
tradition, a fact explaining their extensive mobilization and continuous reactions.
It has been mentioned before that fundamentalism for many reasons should not
be equated to amere traditionalism, although this has been also attempted for the
Orthodox case.65Yet, from the above analysis it becomes obvious that here we are
dealing with one of the particularities of Orthodox rigorism due to its specific and
omnipresent relationship to tradition.
Taking into consideration the exogenous causes that have led to the rise of
Orthodox rigorism, we should look for its specific socio-historical background, as
well as for its later transformations and contemporary socio-cultural contexts.
These causes should be primarily sought from the early modern times onwards, as
theOrthodoxworld in its different contexts (e.g. theRussianEmpire, theBalkans
under Ottoman rule) has increasingly come into contact with Western modernity
and was influenced accordingly in many domains. It was a process that created
quite serious engagements, tensions, debates and conflicts in the Orthodox world
and led in many cases to deep cleavages in the respective societies between pro-
Western and anti-Western trends, movements and actors. As was to be expected,
theOrthodox sidewas overwhelmingly alignedwith the anti-Western camp and at
times played the leading role in the respective reactions. It was exactly this wide
exposure to Western influences over the last centuries that led, among other
things, to the rise of modern Orthodox rigorism.
Such developments can be clearly observed in the Russian Empire especially
after the Westernizing and modernizing efforts of Tsar Peter I, which were con-
tinued throughout the 18th century under the decisive influence ofWest European
Enlightenment. The latter, in fact, set the main premises for theWestern program
of modernity and its wider application.66 The related socio-cultural changes were
often perceived as dramatic crises and led to various rigorist reactions in Russia,
including those of the previously mentioned Old Believers, who saw the clear
evidence of the distancing from the pureOrthodox tradition in theWesternization
process. Given that the official church was in many ways tightly bound to the
Tsarist regime and did not present any serious challenge to the attempted societal
changes under Western influence, rigorist reactions here originated mostly from
the monastic milieus or independent Orthodox believers and thinkers. The re-
lated problems became more evident especially during the 19th century when the
key problem of Russia!s identity and future course was strongly debated among a
large variety of competing ideological currents and movements, representing at
65 See Yannaras 1992.
66 See Eisenstadt 1999, pp. 119–135.
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times diametrically opposed views and attitudes. Many of them stood in different
forms under the formative influence of the Orthodox tradition (e.g. the Slavo-
philes), yet they did not represent stricto sensu rigorist reactions. As already
mentioned, not all Orthodox protest formations and actions fall under the cat-
egory of rigorism. Some rigorist views can be located in the movement of the so-
called Pochvenniki, namely those close to the “soil” of the Russian land and
people, who were mostly grouped together around a journal named Vremia
(Epoch). At the beginning, they intended to reconcile the Westernizers and the
Slavophiles and received various influences besides the Orthodox ones. Yet, this
initial spirit soon faded, and they started strongly supporting the indigenous el-
ements of Russian culture (e.g. autocracy, anti-Westernism, nationalism) and
“native soil conservatism”67. The exact boundaries between the above groups
were, however, never strict and clear. The well-known writer Fyodor M. Dosto-
evsky thus had close relations both to the Slavophiles and the Pochvenniki.
Characteristically, there is a line of continuity between the Pochvenniki move-
ment and contemporary Orthodox rigorists in post-Soviet Russia.68
Analogous developments can also be observed in theOrthodox Balkans under
Ottoman rule from the second half of the 18th century onwards, again under the
decisive influence of West European Enlightenment. In this context, rigorist re-
actions had more to do with the marginalization of the greater societal role of the
Patriarchate of Constantinople and – more broadly speaking – of an Orthodox-
based worldview in society and culture in the wake of Western secularizing ideas
andpractices. These reactions exhibited various sectarian andutopian elements of
an all-encompassing transcendental order, a central component of proto-funda-
mentalist movements.69 The so-called Kollyvades controversy over the issues of
memorial services and frequent communion, which erupted in the 1750s on the
Holy Mountain Athos and later spread in other areas, demonstrated such char-
acteristics. In fact, it also had to do with the growing Western influences at that
time and their potential threat to the inherited Orthodox tradition. Many of the
protagonists of the Kollyvades movement clearly expressed such a rigorist men-
tality, which forced the official church to take measures against and to condemn
them. The spirit of early Orthodox rigorism lingered on in the 19th century after
the foundation of the Greek state in 1830 and was again expressed by various
actors, movements and organizations in different forms, mostly in strong anti-
Western settings, ranging from a critique of official church decisions to reactions
against academic theology. Numerous Orthodox believers thought that the
church was allowing dangerous compromises to take place and that counter-
action to stop the demise of Orthodoxy was imperative.70 The subjection of the
67 See Dowler 1983.
68 See Aksiuchits 1990; Selbach 2002, pp. 140–143, 147–152.
69 See Eisenstadt 1999, pp. 25–27.
70 See Giannakopoulos 1999, pp. 37–196.
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church to the state during the regime of the Bavarian King Otto (1833–1862), the
unilateral declaration of its autocephaly and independence from the Patriarchate
of Constantinople in 1833, and the closing of numerous monasteries throughout
the country were among the radical changes that triggered rigorist reactions and
popular protest movements, such as the one led by Christophoros Pana-
giotopoulos, alias Papoulakos (1770–1861). The socio-religious criticism of the
monk Kosmas Flamiatos (1786–1852) and that of the lay popular preacher
Apostolos Makrakis (1831–1905) are also cases in point. Aside from this, Or-
thodox rigorists still foundways to cooperate with the church in the second half of
the 19th century, especially in the context of the virulent Greek nationalism and
irredentism.
In the course of the 20th centurymany predominantly Orthodox countries were
found under a long communist rule (1917–1991), and this of course heavily af-
fected the respective positions of theOrthodoxChurches, whichwere subjected to
the inimical attitude of, and often to persecution by, the communist regimes. This
was a serious curtailment of Orthodox rigorist reactions in these countries. Yet,
such attitudes were clearly observed among various church formations that had
originated in this context and later became active outside the realm of commu-
nism. The most characteristic case is that of the Russian Orthodox Church Out-
side Russia (ROCOR), which separated itself from the Moscow Patriarchate in
1927 and developed further in theWest, endorsing inmany cases rigorist positions
(e.g. anti-Ecumenical). It also cooperated and entered into church communion in
1994 through a formal act with various groups of Old Calendarists in Greece,
Bulgaria and Romania. This lasted until 2006 when the ROCOR started dis-
cussions about its reunion with the Russian Orthodox Church, which formally
took place in 2007. In addition, back in 1955, some bishops from theROCORhad
enabled the canonical continuity of succession within the Old Calendarist
movement by consecrating an archbishop and other bishops.71 The latter, as al-
ready mentioned, was the outcome of the increased openings of the Patriarchate
of Constantinople towards modern demands (e.g. on the calendar issue), but also
towards other Christian Churches (e.g. with the encyclical of 1920 “To the
Churches ofChrist wheresoever theymaybe”).72For the rigorists, this attested not
only to the “heresy of Ecumenism”, but also to the internal decaying of Orthodox
Church leaders supporting such dangerous innovations.73 All this had in turn
serious implications for local Orthodox Churches, such as the Greek one, causing
again rigorist opposition that culminated in the Old Calendarist schism.74
Orthodox rigorist reactions were intensified even further in the second half of
the 20th century due to the ongoing transnational process of globalization, which
71 See Brady / Melling 2001, pp. 354–355.
72 See Keleher 2001.
73 See Ware, 2002, p. 7.
74 See Kitsikis 1995, pp. 8–19.
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entailed a series of economic, political and cultural transformations including the
feared erosion of local religious and national identities. In fact, the connection of
the globalization process with the intensification of fundamentalist and other
related movements and reactions worldwide has been emphasized by many the-
orists.75 The post-World War II period saw namely the emergence of common
transnational patterns in all domains, from global polity and economy to religion,
which were connected with a weakening of Western hegemony and concomitant
new challenges for local cultures.76 Globalization went hand in hand with an
unprecedented influx of new lifestyles, ideas andmorals, which was perceived as a
serious problem by the rigorists. The present global syncretistic environment with
its ideals of pluralism, secularism, multiculturalism, tolerance, and liberalism put
the rigorist view on the uniqueness of the Orthodox truth to the test and threat-
ened their exclusivity and superiority claims about an Orthodox hegemonic cul-
ture. It is not an accident, for example, that rigorists have been very critical to the
adhesion of Greece to the European Economic Community in 1981.77 In con-
nection with this, the current postmodern era of change, relativism, ambiguity,
contingency and uncertainty has also prompted fundamentalist particularistic
reactions of all kinds,78 and the same holds true for the Orthodox rigorists as well.
A new era of an Orthodox rigorist resurgence took place after the collapse of
the communist regimes and the concomitant liberalization of religion in the re-
spective countries. The Orthodox Churches and cultures of the former Eastern
Bloc were suddenly found in a period of transition and restructuring, which in-
cluded a lot of unexpected serious challenges within the current global environ-
ment. One such challenge related to coming to terms with religious and cultural
pluralism. It is thus not accidental that Orthodox rigorismwas often intensified in
such contexts and received wider support from numerous believers, especially as
the boundaries between the religious and the secular shifted causingmajor culture
wars.79 In post-Soviet Russia several Orthodox actors today exhibit key rigorist
characteristics, are critical of the pro-Western orientations of non-Orthodox or
secular actors, oppose inter-Christian dialogue and Ecumenical initiatives, and
criticize the official church of endorsing compromising positions.80 In addition, we
can witness here the rise of various Orthodox apocalyptic and eschatological
scenarios about the imminent end of the world, the coming of the Antichrist, the
Jewish and Masonic plan for worldwide domination and numerous other con-
spiracy theories (e. g. about the ritual murder of the last Tsarist family by the
75 See Antes 2002.
76 See Eisenstadt 1999, pp. 135–149.
77 See Giannakopoulos 1999, pp. 347–366.
78 See Bauman 1997, pp. 165–185.
79 See Kishkovsky 2000.
80 See Kostiuk 2000; Verkhovsky 2002; Walters 2007; Stieger 2011; Kadotschnikow
2014.
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Bolsheviks). It should not be forgotten that the well-known anti-Semitic con-
spiracy text The Protocols of the Elders of Zion was forged and first published in
the Russian Empire at the beginning of the 20th century, whereas it also enjoys
great popularity in post-Soviet times.81
All this often brings Orthodox rigorists closer to various other groups in con-
temporary Russia, including monarchists, nationalists, fascists, Eurasianists, or
neo-communists. Despite their differences in ideology, orientations and ob-
jectives, they all aim in one way or another to defend the Orthodox and national
character of the country from an inimical, Western-led takeover.82 Further,
rigorist attitudes flourish in various Orthodox organizations and brotherhoods of
lay believers, headed by a lay elder or a clergyman, which are not under the direct
control of the church (e.g. the Obshchestvo “Radonezh”).83 The boundaries be-
tween these brotherhoods remain generally fluid. Although there are certain
more liberal ones, in most cases they exhibit the usual features of Orthodox
rigoristmentality (e.g. anti-Western, anti-Ecumenical, xenophobic).84Theofficial
church has repeatedly tried to control and coordinate the activities of these
brotherhoods through a “Union of Orthodox Brotherhoods”, founded in 1990.
Yet, it is clear that this was not the case in the long run, simply because of the
extreme rigorist views and tendencies flourishing within such milieus, which are
incompatible with the rather moderate attitude of the official church.85
Even if not in control of the church hierarchy, rigorists in post-communist
Russia constantly put pressure on it, while their positions are often reflected in
official church statements and policies.86 Thus, they often force the church to
criticize or take measures against liberal and reformist Orthodox priests (e. g.
Father Georgii Kotchetkov), who are considered dangerous for upholding the
authentic Orthodox tradition.87 Once more, an absolute distinction between the
church hierarchy and the rigorists becomes difficult, as they often sharemore than
they openly confess; for example, a conservative discourse presenting Orthodox
Russia as an effective antidote against the constant decline of the fallen modern
world due to Western influences.88 There have also been attempts at a politi-
81 See Hagemeister 2006. This text enjoys popularity in other Orthodox cultures as
well, not only among rigorists, but also among members of the church hierarchy. Con-
cerning Greece, see Psarras 2013.
82 See Shenfield 2001, pp. 48–73; Shnirelman 2015.
83 See Verkhovskii 1998–99, pp. 98–109.
84 See Rock 2002 and 2003; see also Rousselet 1993.
85 See Rock 2003, pp. 339–342; see also Mitrofanova 2014.
86 See Selbach 2002.
87 See Sourozh 56 (May 1994), pp. 53–54; 58 (November 1994), pp. 47–48; 85 (August
2001), pp. 50–51; see further Selbach 2002, pp. 143–146; Agadjanian 2014, pp. 191–207;
Brüning 2016.
88 See Verkhovsky 2006.
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cization of Orthodoxy, in which rigorist circles are sometimes actively involved.89
Among other cases, this form of “political Orthodoxy” has already been observed
in the Ukraine during the 2000s and more recently during the Russian-Ukrainian
conflict in the separatist region of Eastern Ukraine (Luhansk and Donetsk),
receiving support from various church circles including official ones.90Despite all
this, we should not overlook the fact that post-Soviet Russian Orthodoxy exhibits
further characteristics that do not belong to the above categories.91
Taking a look at some other cases, the consecutive wars during the 1990s and
the subsequent final dissolution of Yugoslavia have also caused various reactions
on the part of Orthodox Serbian rigorists. These have a strong anti-Western tra-
dition of their own, which has re-emerged after communism in novel forms;92 for
example, through the ultra-Orthodox brotherhood Obraz (Honor), through the
canonization of conservative and anti-Western clerics, such asNikolaiVelimirovic´
(1881–1956) and Justin Popovic´ (1894–1979), or through the critique of liberal-
minded clerics, such as Radovan Bigovic´ (1956–2012). In general, traditionalist
and conservative attitudes predominate in the post-communist period, which is
understandable in the light of the radical socio-political and cultural changes
effected there. Orthodox rigorists have also interpreted the deep and tenacious
financial crisis of Greece since 2009 in similar, conspiracy-driven negative col-
ours.93 The “new world order”, brought about by several ground-breaking
changes (political, military, economic, cultural etc.), is usually interpreted by the
rigorists according to their own conspiracy logic.
As already mentioned, Orthodox rigorists are not found today solely in the
historical Orthodox heartlands, but are also spread in the Orthodox diaspora
across the globe and in quite different settings. The phenomenon of growing
Orthodox transnationalism94 has also contributed to this internationalization of
rigorism with diverse consequences. One may thus find Old Calendarists oper-
ating in the USA (e.g. the Center for Traditionalist Orthodox Studies, Etna, CA),
and elsewhere in the West, opposing not only Ecumenism and the calendar re-
form, but the overall threat of modernism to the church. They sometimes attempt
to create a broader pan-Orthodox rigorist front against the respective church
hierarchies and try to keep the outer boundaries of Orthodox identification as
strict as possible; for example, by outright negating the canonicity and legitimacy
89 See Mitrofanova 2004.
90 See Hovorun 2016, pp. 58–60.
91 See Agadjanian 2014 and 2015.
92 See Buchenau 2006, 2011a and 2011b.
93 See online article “Senior Greek Priest Blames Jews for Greece!s Financial
Problems”, available at: http://www.haaretz.com/jewish-world/senior-greek-priest-blames-
jews-for-greece-s-financial-problems-1.332131 [24.01.2016].
94 See Roudometof 2015.
239
Orthodox Christian rigorism
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC-ND
of the sacraments (e. g. baptism) performed by non-Orthodox Christians.95 In
other cases, tensions arise when Orthodox monastic elders (ge´1onte& or startsy)
try to disseminate their rigorist views and practices to Orthodox communities in
Western settings; a process that may lead to internal tensions and divisions be-
tween traditionalist and more progressive members within such communities.96
All this happens because of the widespread belief among rigorists and other
Orthodox believers that these monastics, due to their ascetic life and contact with
God, possess a particular understanding of the Orthodox truth (a kind of hidden,
esoteric knowledge), as well as special abilities (e. g. in foreseeing future events).
It goes without saying that such persons are then turned into the main “guardians
of Orthodoxy”, and their popularity and authority are extremely enhanced,
sometimes at the expense of official church positions. But the samemay happen in
the historical Orthodox heartlands as well, especially when not only monastic
elders, but also young, inexperienced and immature clerics (mladostarchestvo)
acquire such a spiritual authority in an Orthodox community, thus again causing
various problems and tensions.97
Finally, it is interesting tomention that Orthodox rigorism relates to the notion
of the decoupling of religion and culture, elaborated by Olivier Roy.98 This is not
understood here in the sense of a de-territorialization of religion in the wake of its
separation from a local culture due to the process of globalization. Neither has it
to do with the quest for a “pure religion” independent of cultural variations and
local influences. It is more related to the fact that rigorists oppose a trans-
formation of religion into a culture, basically understood as a profane entity,
which is a dominant trend in the context of secularization and the emphasis put on
worldly concerns. Thereby religion loses its primary character and is transformed
into a broader and non-binding element that belongs to a rather all-inclusive
cultural frame of reference. In this sense, culture is regarded as a threat, given that
ideally – according to the rigorist worldview – everything has to be or to become
“religious”. It is thus a basic conviction of the rigorists that the Orthodox Church
has gradually moved in this direction, lost its critical, prophetic voice in society,
and surrendered itself to the growing pressure of the surrounding secular culture.
As a result, it was forced to make various minor and major compromises that
jeopardize the highly cherished right faith, namelyOrthodoxy. In the end, to be an
Orthodox today means belonging to a specific culture, which naturally includes
much more than religion and in which the Orthodox factor plays more or less an
insignificant, decorative role. By contrast, according to the rigorists, the church
should be liberated from this adulterating “cultural captivity” and get rid of its
mere characterization as a coincidental feature of a specific cultural identity. As a
95 See Morris 1998. For a characteristic case, see Cavarnos 1992.
96 See Cimino 2011.
97 See Hovorun 2016, p. 57; see also Vladimir 2005.
98 See Roy 2010.
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consequence, patterns of modern religiosity, such as when Orthodoxy is under-
stood as a form of “diffused religion”, as an abstract, non-normative category
devoid of any concrete practical consequences, and as a cultural asset and integral
part of amodern broader cultural identity,99 are repudiated by the rigorists.On the
contrary, they support a firm, conscious and genuine attachment to the Orthodox
tradition and a real and precise familiarity with its teachings, practice and spiri-
tuality. Therefore, it is no surprise that they criticize the majority of the main-
stream believers as exhibiting signs of Orthodox anemia, because the latter go to
church only on selected occasions (e. g. great feasts or rites of passage) and are
religious only superficially and nominally.Needless to say, all this turns against the
secularization process, which entails significant transformations of religious belief
and belonging in the postmodern context.
3. Are there any Orthodox resources against rigorism?
The above elaborations on the various facets ofOrthodox rigorism in the past and
at present do not signify that this is the most prominent feature of Orthodox
Christianity. The latter constitutes a much more pluriform and diversified system
with a great variety of aspects and expressions. The mainstream Orthodox be-
lievers, being attached rather to a cultural form of Orthodoxy, do not support
rigorism and do not share its views on church and society. In other words, it is not
amiss to argue that rigorism is a marginal phenomenon within the Orthodox
world, also from a quantitative perspective.
Yet, there are two things to be taken into account at this point: first, due to the
rigorists! relationswith the official church hierarchy and theirmobilization power,
rigorist attitudes and actions become at times quite visible in society, thus they
may attract not only the occasional curiosity of outside observers, but also greater
attention from various social strata. Second, rigorism receives support, both di-
rectly and indirectly, from the fact that the Orthodox Christian milieu still re-
mains, to a large extent, quite traditionalist withmany respective characteristics, a
fact that differentiates it substantially from the respective Protestant and Roman
Catholic cases in Western Europe. It is still a milieu that cherishes the un-
questioned authorities of the past and lacks self-critical attitudes and a con-
structive view of the future. Therefore, it is not accidental thatmodern theological
methods and hermeneutics have so far found little fertile ground to develop in
Orthodox contexts. All this is particularly conducive to the emergence of Or-
thodox rigorism.
In order to better capture the specificities of Orthodox Christianity and its
multiple repercussions, one must take into consideration the fundamental fact
that its encounter and relationship withmodernity – in contrast toWest European
99 See Makrides 2003, pp. 211–215.
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Christianity – were partial, fragmented, limited and incomplete. It thus never had
the consequences that were made possible in theWest, a development that in the
long run changed the profiles of the respective churches there.100 This concerns a
variety of key issues that have shaped modern cultural values, ranging from in-
dividual human rights and personal autonomy to liberal, pluralist and secular
ideals. Orthodox Churches, however, still have great problems coping with these
developments, simply because they have never experienced the processes and
changes that led to them in a full and constructive way. The post-communist
Russian Church with its current critique of the basic tenets of Western modernity
including individual human rights is a clear case in point.101 The same concerns
otherOrthodoxmilieus in post-communist times as well102, such asGeorgia103 and
Romania104. Interestingly enough, similar problems can also be observed in Or-
thodox Greece, a country that always belonged to theWestern orbit of influence.
In general, the Orthodox discourse still shows certain clear predilections that are
closely related to the lack of a productive encounter withmodernity.As a result, it
often tries to answer or solve modern problems and challenges by reference to a
pre-modern logic and frame of ideas, based on the authorities of the past (Church
Fathers etc.). By contrast, all this may explain why West European Christianity
exhibits other facets. It has already had a long and painful, yet constructive en-
counter with modernity; for example, with the Enlightenment, which led to its
greater rationalization and secularization. This also explains why we do not
commonly find strong fundamentalist movements on the West European reli-
gious scene contrary to the USA, where the impact of the Enlightenment was
quite a different one. An absence of the Enlightenment influence can also be
claimed for Orthodox Eastern and South Eastern Europe,105 which may also
account for several of its religious and cultural idiosyncrasies including rigorism.
It is in this context that Orthodox rigorists may expectedly not only exist and
survive, but also sometimes thrive and flourish. ThewholeOrthodox environment
is hence conducive to their genesis and rise in the first place, especially as they
tend to bemore extreme in their critical stance towards, or negation of, modernity
and of the spirit underlying it. In many respects, they represent pretty well what
Olivier Roy has called “holy ignorance”106. This is because their understanding of
the Orthodox tradition is reductionist, fragmented and lacks the sophistication
and the critical awareness induced by sound historical analysis, modern con-
100 See Makrides 2012; Kalaitzidis 2015.
101 SeeAgadjanian 2014, pp. 113–174, 243–264. See also various articles inMakrides /
Wasmuth / Kube 2016, pp. 27–136.
102 See various cases in Clark 2000.
103 See Crego 2014.
104 See Turcescu / Stan 2014.
105 See Kitromilides 2016.
106 See Roy 2010.
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textual thinking and the ability for self-reflection.107 They sense the need to ob-
jectify their beliefs in such a way as to feel absolutely secure and to cast away any
external influences or critical views. For them, to believe, even blindly and dog-
matically, is far more important than to try to know better. For example, their
attachment to the Bible and other authoritative texts of Orthodox Christianity or
to the Church Fathers is uncritical, mythical, and credulous.108 Modern herme-
neutics or other methods of examining past texts and their heritage (e.g. the
historical-critical one) are practically unknown in rigorist milieus. They usually
speak of the incomparable value and significance of the Orthodox tradition as a
taboo, yet they basically “ignore” how this tradition came about, what exactly it
contains, and how it should be interpreted today.All this is, however, of no interest
to them, as this mostly irrational, instinctual, and na.ve adherence to what they
consider as “sacred” conveys to them certainty, security and confidence. It goes
without saying that this attitude reflects the traditional Orthodox anti-in-
tellectualism, which is expressed in numerous forms (e.g. as a critique of modern
academic theology109).
Does all this mean that rigorism goes unchallenged and gets no response or
critique at all withinOrthodox contexts? In fact, the opposite is the case. First, the
church hierarchy, either officially or through its individual members, often de-
nounces the rigorist views, actions and excesses as deviating from, or as not ex-
pressing, the genuine Orthodox tradition. This is because rigorist activities in
many cases do not please the official church, as they may be outspokenly directed
against it. On the other hand, as already mentioned, the church may use and
instrumentalize rigorists for various purposes, and there are church hierarchs who
are close to the rigorists and their perceptions while supporting them. This am-
bivalent attitude complicates the whole situation and explains why such official
church critique against the rigorists does not bear fruits and remains mostly in-
effective.
More substantial critique against rigorism originates from other Orthodox
milieus, namely from independent clerics, lay theologians and other thinkers
dealing with Orthodox Christianity, who are in a better position to realize the
problems created by rigorism and attempt to find ways to neutralize this phe-
nomenon. This is attempted not only in the historical Orthodox heartlands, but
also in the Orthodox diasporic communities, as many Orthodox there can make
pertinent comparisons between Orthodox rigorism and other forms of funda-
mentalism. Here the need to avoid extreme positions and to follow a rather
middle and reasonable way is mostly emphasized. This can be basically accom-
107 See the words of the previously mentioned monk Theophanes: “I!ve stopped
reading books myself […] The Divine Liturgy contains all the writing I need. Once you!ve
read the Word of God everything else becomes very dull.” (Dalrymple 1998, p. 290).
108 See Demacopoulos 2015; Hovorun 2016, p. 57.
109 See Metallinos 1989.
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plished through a moderately critical view on tradition, as the danger to fall into
an arid traditionalism remains always imminent. Seminal Orthodox theological
thinkers of the 20th century are also adduced to show how one should deal with
tradition constructively and creatively and not follow it blindly.110 In addition, the
involvement of the Orthodox Churches in the broader Ecumenical Movement
exhibits numerous positive and constructive sides, which clearly speak against the
anti-Ecumenism of the rigorists and of certain church circles. In fact, the Ortho-
dox Churches historically contributed a lot to the Ecumenical Movement during
the 20th century and in many cases played a pioneering role.111 Despite various
problems and anti-Ecumenical reactions in post-communist times, most Ortho-
dox Churches are still actively involved in numerous related endeavors and ac-
complish a great deal internationally. During various consultations (e. g. at the
Pan-OrthodoxConference inThessaloniki, 29April – 1May 1998) it has also been
clearly emphasized that the eventual official Orthodox dissatisfaction with some
developments within the Ecumenical Movement should not be confused with the
criticism exerted on it by various Orthodox rigorists, given that these two have
quite different causes, orientations and purposes.112
In most times, the critique against rigorism is articulated in a broader frame,
namely by indicating and emphasizing the pressing need for theOrthodoxChurch
to come to terms in more constructive ways with the heritage of modernity. It is
well-known that this is a long and also painful process, as it involves considerable
changes and an outspoken reform mentality. As a result, it cannot take place
automatically, and judging from the already strong reactions to such a kind of
Orthodox reform thinking, it will not be an easy task without conflicts. Yet, it is
more than clear that any meaningful opposition to rigorism is closely connected
with such broader self-critical developments within theOrthodox world. In a way,
the Orthodox should learn from the Protestant and Roman Catholic experiences
with modernity and formulate their own agenda and strategy of dealing with it.
They also have to overcome their tenacious and arid anti-Westernism and look for
ways of amore fruitful encounter with theWest and its historical heritage (e.g. the
Enlightenment tradition). As already mentioned, there are many signs that such
fermentations in various forms are taking place within the Orthodox world of
today, even at the official church level. Such is the case of the Volos Academy for
Theological Studies in Greece, a progressive forum of theological reflection in
close relationship with the surrounding secular culture under the aegis of the local
diocese.113But again this specific endeavor has encountered quite a few reactions
and negative criticisms, not only from the rigorist camp, but also from certain
traditionalist church hierarchs and other Orthodox actors. It becomes then clear
110 See Plekon 2010; Kattan 2015.
111 See Kalaitzidis et al. 2014.
112 See Makrides 2004, p. 518.
113 See Kalaitzidis 2015, pp. 85–87.
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that Orthodox Christianity still exhibits strong and widespread conservative
predilections and leanings that may inhibit real reforms to take place. Be that as it
may, we are still at the beginning of a long-term process that will possibly enable
the emergence of a new and reformed Orthodox world in the future.
Generally, church leaders tend to underestimate the importance of rigorism or
to disqualify it as a foreign intruder into the pristine Orthodox tradition and as an
ineffective strategy in the modern global environment.114 At the same time, they
try to control its bearers and soften their extremism, so that theymay use them for
various purposes. In this article, however, themain goal was not somuch to locate
foreign influences upon Orthodox rigorism, such as from Protestant fundamen-
talism, but rather to assess its presence in its real dimensions within the broader
Orthodox landscape by analyzing its main manifestations, socio-cultural back-
ground and evolution, as well as its ambivalent relations with the church hier-
archy. Bearing all this in mind, it is likely that the particular coexistence between
the official church and the rigorists will continue in the years to come, together
with the phases of their collaboration, as well as of their conflict. In all probability,
rigorists will not gain control of the official church in the near future, but the
pressure that they may exert on it will certainly continue to be a serious factor in
shaping future church politics. No doubt, the ongoing globalization process and its
further implementation will have far-reaching consequences for Orthodox local
identities and will probably exacerbate even stronger rigorist reactions. This may
lead to unexpected alliances among the opponents of globalization, regardless if
they originate from quite diverse backgrounds. From this point of view, it makes
little sense if one classifies Orthodox rigorists, Protestant fundamentalists and all
similarly-minded groups in a simplistic way as irrational fanatics and threats to
world stability. Aside from the conflicts and polarizations produced by such
protest movements, it is more interesting to assess their open and patent role in
society and how they are linked to the establishments, both religious and secular,
that they most vehemently criticize. Such an antinomy can be clearly observed, as
already mentioned, on the Holy Mountain Athos, where this traditionally anti-
Western monastic community receives today large amounts of money from the
European Union for restoration and modernization works; a process that, how-
ever, threatens to alter substantially its time-honored image. It is also exciting to
examine what makes such conservative movements like rigorism appealing, at-
tractive and quite successful amongmany categories of people, sometimes in clear
opposition to various liberal, progressive and trendier religious groups.115 In our
specific case, the previously analyzed endogenous causes for the genesis and the
development of Orthodox rigorism may account for this.
No doubt, Orthodox rigorism appears to be at times vehemently anti-modern
and anti-Western, yet at the same time it deals with modernity in its own manner.
114 See Papandreou 2000, pp. 245–251.
115 See Kelley 1972.
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The latter ranges from the rational goals set and themodernmeans used to realize
them to the “Jacobin”, all-encompassing and even totalitarian component of its
ideology.116 The relationship of Orthodox rigorism with the modern world is not
only antagonistic, but profoundly ambiguous too.117 It is thus vital to pay equal
attention to the ways in which this protest movement reformulates and recon-
stitutes the concept of modernity itself and comes to terms with it. A potential
distinction between modernity and modernism should be made here.118 Rigorists
are not againstmodern technical developments, which they use for their own sake.
They basically react against the spirit underlying all these modern changes, which
relativizes notions of absolute religious truth, emphasizes the secular and supports
a permissive, liberal ethos. All this underlines the multifaceted and complex ap-
pearances of the phenomenon under investigation.
On the one hand, the fact that Orthodox rigorists accuse the official church of
deviations and innovations shows that the concept of tradition and its alleged
unaltered preservation in our milieu has to be viewed in another light. Tradition
does not represent an immutable and static entity, but is constantly, critically and
creatively re-interpreted, re-adjusted and re-constructed by all actors involved.119
This takes place even in highly traditionalmilieus like theOrthodox one, although
this is not openly acknowledged by the official hierarchy. In addition, the fact that
rigorists support the official church occasionally or are used by it in many in-
stances likewise indicates that their own concept of tradition is not a static one, but
rather flexible and adjustable too. After all, they are not mere traditionalists, but
rather “radical traditionalists”, namely representing a historical process of in-
novation of their own.120 Hence, they make selective use of both the Orthodox
tradition andmodernity. Ironically enough, their vision to restore an ideal order of
the past often ends in an innovative adaptation to the socio-cultural conditions of
today. Given the fundamental “heterodoxy” of such protest movements,121 this
innovation process is not far from the construction of “alternative” and even of
“mutating memories” within religious traditions,122 as they evolve continuously
and are closely related to processes of general socio-cultural change.
116 See Eisenstadt 1999, pp. 82–118.
117 See Makrides 1994, pp. 11–13.
118 See Lawrence 1989, pp. 1–3.
119 See Hervieu-L-ger 2000, pp. 83–89.
120 See Riesebrodt 2000, pp. 276–277.
121 See Eisenstadt 1999.
122 See Davie 2000b, pp. 138–155.
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